Enterprise

The control plane for agent risk.

Find every agent, red-team it on a schedule, enforce Cedar policy at chokepoints you already control, and hand a regulator signed evidence.

Enforcement

0ms added to the request path

Access grant, deploy gate, deny rules AWS itself enforces — plus the kill switch.

Audit retention

10 years, signed and write-once

Up to ten years where the EU AI Act requires it.

Regulator coverage

7 frameworks mapped

MAS, APRA, EU AI Act, DORA, NIST AI RMF, ISO 42001, Fed SR 11-7.

CI integrations

GitHub, GitLab, Azure DevOps

Deploy gates block unapproved agents; the CLI runs in any pipeline.

One-click discovery to regulator-ready proof.

Connect your AWS account read-only, and discovery, red teaming, policy, and cost attribution start the same day.

Discovery & Registry01 / 11

Find every agent. Know every agent.

Estate → business unit · registered agentschip = spend / month
lambda-exec-prod-7no owner
step-fn-worker-11no owner
2 of 18 shadowtriage queue1 click → enroll
registeredshadowlowelevatedhigh risk
Discovery & Registry
i.1Read-only discovery from Bedrock, CloudTrail, IAM, and billing — no agent code changes
i.2Shadow agents found by subtraction: every model call minus governed identities
i.3One registry record per agent — ownership, risk tier, cost — survives every redeploy
Red Teaming5 Triggers02 / 11

One attack engine, five triggers.

Adversarial surface index

Ten attack surfaces, scored before the gate.

Goal hijackTool misusePrivilege abuseSupply chainCode executionMemory poisoningAgent-to-agentCascading failureTrust exploitBehavioural drift
0 = compromised at the centre · 100 = defended at the rim

payments-orchestrator · pre-gate scan · AIVSS 8.9 · 4 criticals → blocked from production

BLOCKED · unresolved criticals
Red Teaming
ii.1Five triggers: pre-deploy gate, CI scan, schedule, drift, on-demand
ii.2Attacks run in hardened sandbox replicas, never against production
ii.3AIVSS scoring (AI Vulnerability Scoring System) weighs autonomy — the same bug scores higher with money-moving tools
The Console03 / 11

The executive risk rollup — AIVSS score, agent breakdown, posture trend.

Every view is scoped by role — the full estate for Security Engineers, immutable evidence and audit log for Auditor Read-Only.

Posture · last 30 daysorders-estate · tenant_prod
AIVSS 67 · down 4.1
Agents
247
T1 critical
2
↓ 1
T2 high
11
↑ 2
Drift alerts
1
support-rag
AIVSS posture trend
30d ago15dtoday
Top agents by AIVSS
payments-orchestratorT18.9
shadow-extract-svcT18.4
kyc-routerT26.7
support-ragT25.6
claims-botT33.1
.agentguardian.yaml

Scope, budget, rules of engagement — declared.

Every registered agent pins a scan manifest under version control: which probes run, against what, with what budget. The manifest configures scans; the signed Agent Contract records authorization.

agent: payments-orchestrator
tier: T1
scope:
  framework: langgraph
  endpoint: bedrock://agentcore/payments-v3
  tools: [stripe, postgres, internal-fraud]
roe:
  banned_targets: [prod-customer-pii]
  redact: [card_number, cvv]
budget:
  max_calls: 4000
  max_usd: 18.50
probes:
  - asi01_prompt_injection
  - asi04_tool_invocation_abuse
  - asi09_memory_poisoning
  - mutators: [bon, flipattack, manyshot, h_cot]
report:
  frameworks: [mas_airg, apra_cps_230]
  sarif: true
Lints in the editor. Diffs land in the audit log.
Control Plane

Dashboards, RBAC, and tenancy.

iii.1Cognito + SAML SSO, External-ID hardened IAM, per-tenant CMKs
iii.2Four roles, from Org Admin to Auditor Read-Only
iii.3Data plane runs in your AWS account, installed via CloudFormation StackSet
PolicyCedar 4.504 / 11

Author, simulate, and ship policy.

Policies are linted, simulated against fixtures from the latest scan, and shipped as KMS-signed bundles. Enforcement compiles to chokepoints you already control — zero latency added.

Cedar 4.5 source · payments-orchestrator
// rule: gate any tool call that touches PII on a T1 agent
forbid (
  principal in Agent::"payments-orchestrator",
  action == Action::"InvokeTool",
  resource in ToolGroup::"data-egress"
)
when {
  principal.tier == "T1" &&
  context.aivss >= 7.0 &&
  context.probe_evidence contains "asi01_prompt_injection"
};

// rule: budget breach trips the circuit breaker —
// throttle, suspend, or revoke. Also stops denial-of-wallet.
forbid (
  principal in Agent::"*",
  action == Action::"ModelInvoke",
  resource in Model::"bedrock"
)
when { context.usd_24h >= principal.budget.max_usd };
LINT · okSIM · 12 / 12 fixtures passBUNDLE v4.1.3 · sha256 4a7c…b819
Policy

Cedar policy at the chokepoints.

iv.1Authored, linted, and simulated in AgentGuardian — one source of truth
iv.2Enforced at the access grant, deploy gate, and deny rules AWS itself enforces
iv.3Versioned bundles: two-person review, KMS-signed deploy, rollback by hash

Shadow → canary → enforce.

ShadowPolicies evaluate against live telemetry; decisions logged, nothing enforced.
CanaryDeny rules apply to a share of principals; drift detector watches false positives.
EnforceCompiled to cloud-native deny at the grant and the deploy gate. Rollback by hash.
Every transition is a hash-chained audit-log entry.
Lifecycle & Contract5 Gates05 / 11

The Agent Contract — one record everything acts on.

Approval produces the Agent Contract — risk tier, kill criteria, and the budget caps the kill switch enforces. Immutable and versioned; a material change drafts a new version for re-signature.

Proposed
intake · auto risk-tier
Risk-Assessed
approval chain routed by tier
verified
In-Testing
red-team pass required
verified
Pre-Prod Approval
business + CISO sign-off
verified
signed · 2026-07-14
Production
live · monitored · drift-watched
147 agents in scope · 9 high-risk routed to the full chain · gates check the running system.
Approval routing

Sign-off scales with risk.

Low risk auto-approves on owner attestation; critical needs the full chain and a clean red-team pass. Every sign-off is a cryptographic signature, not a checkbox.

Verified, not attested

Gates check the running system.

No production until access matches the contract, telemetry is live, and every gate passes.

Kill SwitchRevokes in Seconds06 / 11

Halt one agent, or the whole fleet, in seconds.

Budget breaches, destructive-action attempts, and red-team findings wire straight to it. Revocation cuts the credential — the next action cannot execute.

Scope

One agent, or the fleet.

Revoke resolves to a real actuator — credential, cloud deny rule, or your own workflow — per agent, or the whole fleet at once.

Blast-radius preview

See the impact first.

Before you confirm, you see every credential, system, and downstream agent the revocation touches.

Controlled reactivation

No quiet switch-back.

Type-to-confirm on the way down; cooldown and remediation check on the way back. Every activation is an append-only audit entry.

Cost & FinOpsEarly Access07 / 11

Every dollar, attributed to a governed agent.

Seven of eight plotted agents clear break-even.

0x1x2x3x4x5x$0$0.5K$1.0K$1.5K$2.0K$2.5KMONTHLY SPEND →ROI →EFFICIENTPROTECT & SCALELOW VALUE · LOW COSTCANCEL CANDIDATESBREAK-EVEN · 1.0× ROIpayments-orchestratorbatch-enrich

239 of 247 agents have no recorded ROI and are not plotted.

T1 criticalT2 highT3 standard
Cost & FinOps · Early access
vii.1Six cost buckets per agent, reconciled nightly against the AWS bill
vii.2Budget breaches trip the kill switch — throttle, suspend, or revoke
vii.3Cost-versus-value quadrant: what each agent costs against what it returns
Integrations08 / 11

Frameworks, MCP, CI, and the AgentCore Gateway.

Adapters for the frameworks your team already runs; deploy gates in GitHub Actions, GitLab, and Azure DevOps; the CLI for any pipeline.

Agent frameworks

Adapters

LangChain
LangGraph
CrewAI
OpenAI Agents SDK
AutoGen
Google ADK
AWS Strands
MCP servers
Custom HTTP
CI / VCS

Pipelines

GitHub Actions
GitLab
Azure DevOps
Governance deploy gate · readable block reason
CLI scan-in-CI · any pipeline
PR comment · AIVSS delta vs prior run
Signed scan-results bundle · KMS verify
Webhooks · Slack channel digest
Source telemetry

AWS

AgentCore policy engine · Cedar push
AWS Bedrock model invocations
CloudTrail Lake sweep · agent-call evidence
KMS · CMK signing + verify
S3 Object Lock evidence archive
PrivateLink for tenant access
Splunk · Sentinel · Chronicle · Elastic SIEM out
Evidence · Regulator Packs09 / 11

Signed evidence and a tamper-evident audit chain.

Every finding is sealed into a signed evidence record; every operator action lands in an append-only, hash-chained log.

Evidence pack

pack-2026-Q3

RECORD 01 ·Registry snapshot — 247 agents · 18 shadow · signed
RECORD 02 ·Approval chains — 147 in scope · 9 high-risk · signatures verified
RECORD 03 ·Red-team results — 9 high-risk re-attacked · 0 unresolved criticals
RECORD 04 ·Enforcement log — 1 revoke (budget breach · 03:12 UTC) · hash-chained
sha256 9c8b44e1 · Ed25519 at source · daily Merkle root · RFC 3161 · signing key: your KMS
Evidence Packs

Hash-chained, signed, write-once.

ix.1Per-finding: probe ID, ATLAS technique, CSA category, AIVSS vector, reproduction trace
ix.2Hash-chained, Ed25519-signed at source, daily Merkle roots, RFC 3161 timestamps
ix.3WORM storage — up to ten years where the EU AI Act requires it
Audit Log

Every operator action, append-only.

ix.4Append-only record of every scan, policy change, export, and RBAC mutation
ix.5Auditor read-only role with CSV and JSONL export, no write access
Cryptographic posture: hash-chained append-only records · Ed25519 signatures applied at source · daily Merkle roots · RFC 3161 trusted timestamps · WORM storage (S3 Object Lock Compliance) with retention up to ten years where the EU AI Act requires it, framework-driven defaults elsewhere · signing keys held in your own KMS — even we cannot alter or forge a record.

One crosswalk, seven frameworks, deterministic rebuilds.

Evidence is collected once and mapped through one control crosswalk — adding a regulator adds mappings, not re-collection. Packs rebuild deterministically, framework version pinned by hash.

MAS AIRG
Singapore — AI Risk Governance
Monetary Authority of Singapore
APRA CPS 230 + 234
Australia — Operational risk + info security
incl. 30-Apr-2026 AI letter
EU AI Act
Annex IV technical file — high-risk obligations
European Union
DORA
EU — ICT resilience · Register of Information
European Union
Fed SR 11-7
US — Model risk management
Federal Reserve
NIST AI RMF · ISO 42001
Global — Risk framework + AIMS
NIST · ISO/IEC
RBI FREE-AI
Roadmap
India — Responsible AI framework
Reserve Bank of India
OJK Tata Kelola
Roadmap
Indonesia — FS AI governance
Otoritas Jasa Keuangan
BNM RMiT
Roadmap
Malaysia — Risk Mgmt in Tech
Bank Negara Malaysia
BSP Project Sapiens
Roadmap
Philippines — Central bank AI
Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas
TiersAWS Marketplace SaaS Contract10 / 11

Three tiers. Annual upfront, through AWS.

Billed through AWS Marketplace against committed spend. Every tier runs the data plane inside your own AWS account.

Standard · AWS Marketplace

Standard

Up to 200 agents under management
  • Discovery + AIVSS scoring
  • Two regulator packs
  • Cedar editor in shadow + canary
  • Email support
Talk to Sales
Enterprise · Single-tenant

Enterprise

Unlimited agents under management
  • All regulator-pack templates
  • Custom Cedar authoring + review
  • Dedicated solution architect
  • 24×7 support, custom SLA
  • Single-tenant control plane
Talk to Sales
All tiers include the Apache-2.0 OSS core (PyPI: agent-guardian).
Trust Posture11 / 11

A compliance roadmap, and what this is not.

Compliance roadmap
SOC 2 Type IPlanned · Q4 2026
SOC 2 Type IIPlanned · Q2 2027
ISO/IEC 27001:2022Planned · Q3 2027
ISO/IEC 42001 AIMSSelf-attest planned 2026 · third-party planned Q1 2028
HIPAA BAAPlanned · Q3 2028 · on request
FedRAMP ModeratePath identified · gov-customer triggered
Pen testingPlanned · quarterly stage 1, semi-annual thereafter
Open differentiation
AIVSS formulaPublished with severity and AARS weights
Deterministic stub modeReproduce every finding offline, no model calls
Zero telemetryOSS core ships no phone-home
Apache-2.0 OSS corePyPI: agent-guardian (rc2 live)
Customer-owned keysPer-tenant KMS CMK; Glacien is Sign/Verify only
Reproducible packsHash-pinned framework version + raw findings
What AgentGuardian is not
Not a runtime guardrailWe do not classify or block model output
Not a chatbot moderation toolWe do not score conversations for tone or PII
Not a model-evaluation harnessWe red-team agents; we do not benchmark base models
Not an MLOps platformWe do not train, host, or version models
11 / 11
Enterprise

Bring AgentGuardian into the control plane.
Walk a regulator through it.

We will sweep a sample of your agents, ship a signed evidence pack, and show the policy that would contain the finding.